<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>DHFL on WebNotes</title><link>https://v2.webnotes.in/tags/dhfl/</link><description>Recent content in DHFL on WebNotes</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-IN</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://v2.webnotes.in/tags/dhfl/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>DHFL default impact on mutual funds</title><link>https://v2.webnotes.in/dhfl-default-impact/</link><pubDate>Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://v2.webnotes.in/dhfl-default-impact/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The 2019 default of &lt;strong&gt;Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL)&lt;/strong&gt;, a major Indian housing finance NBFC, caused significant impact on Indian debt mutual fund schemes holding DHFL bonds. The DHFL event, following soon after the &lt;a href="https://v2.webnotes.in/ilfs-default-impact-2018/"&gt;IL&amp;amp;FS default (2018)&lt;/a&gt;
, deepened the NBFC liquidity crisis and contributed to the cumulative regulatory response that shaped Indian debt mutual fund framework.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For Indian retail investors, DHFL was a major housing finance brand prominent in mass-market lending. Its collapse caused both direct losses (for those who held DHFL bonds or fixed deposits) and indirect mutual-fund-mediated losses (for schemes holding DHFL paper).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Side-pocketing framework for Indian debt mutual funds</title><link>https://v2.webnotes.in/side-pocketing-debt-mutual-funds/</link><pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://v2.webnotes.in/side-pocketing-debt-mutual-funds/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;side-pocketing framework for Indian debt mutual funds&lt;/strong&gt; is the SEBI regulatory mechanism, introduced through SEBI Circular SEBI/HO/IMD/DF2/CIR/P/2018/160 dated 28 December 2018, that permits asset management companies (AMCs) to separate distressed or defaulted debt securities from the rest of a &lt;a href="https://v2.webnotes.in/mutual-fund/"&gt;mutual fund&lt;/a&gt;
 scheme&amp;rsquo;s portfolio into a distinct &lt;strong&gt;segregated portfolio&lt;/strong&gt;, ring-fencing the credit event&amp;rsquo;s impact on the main portfolio and preventing the adverse selection dynamic of investors with knowledge of the distress redeeming first at the expense of remaining unit-holders. The framework was SEBI&amp;rsquo;s policy response to the September to October 2018 IL&amp;amp;FS group defaults, which had exposed a substantial gap in the Indian mutual fund regulatory framework: in the absence of a side-pocketing mechanism, AMCs faced an untenable choice between meeting redemptions by selling performing assets (concentrating the distressed exposure in the residual portfolio) and suspending redemptions (a more disruptive action under Regulation 39). The 2018 circular provides an intermediate mechanism that protects continuing investors while preserving the ability to recover from distressed holdings.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>DHFL default impact on credit-risk funds</title><link>https://v2.webnotes.in/dhfl-default-credit-risk-funds/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://v2.webnotes.in/dhfl-default-credit-risk-funds/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;DHFL default and its impact on credit-risk mutual funds&lt;/strong&gt; unfolded through 2019 and 2020 as Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (DHFL), at its peak India&amp;rsquo;s third-largest private housing finance company, progressively ceased to service its market borrowings, ultimately triggering the first use of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) against a financial services entity. For Indian credit-risk funds and other debt mutual fund schemes that held DHFL&amp;rsquo;s non-convertible debentures (NCDs) and commercial paper, the episode produced significant NAV write-downs, accelerated redemptions, and reinforced the market&amp;rsquo;s already-heightened post-&lt;a href="https://v2.webnotes.in/ilfs-default-debt-funds-2018/"&gt;IL&amp;amp;FS&lt;/a&gt;
 scepticism about the creditworthiness of non-bank lenders. The episode also produced SEBI&amp;rsquo;s first large-scale enforcement exercise around credit risk classification and side-pocket usage.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>